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Abstract: Tom Stoppard’s Hapgood has often been discussed as a spy drama employing 
intertextual references to physics (quantum mechanics, uncertainty principle) and mathematics 
(Euler’s geometry) to detect a traitor in the English secret-service network. On several occasions, 
however, Stoppard has argued that the play is specifically about a woman, Hapgood, whose 
identity is not easy to define. On the one hand, she is the leader of a group of agents. On the other, 
she is the mother of little Joe, whose father is Joseph Kerner, a member of the network and an 
atomic physicist whose explanations of physics and mathematics illuminate the meaning of the 
events of the play. Apart from the two elements inherent in the identity of Hapgood, that is, the 
“technical” and the “personal,” she also appears in the double role of herself and her twin sister, 
Celia, this being an attempt, and a successful one, to confirm the suspicions that the traitor in their 
midst is Ridley, who not only is a double agent working both for the English and the Russians but 
also has a real twin brother. 
In 1980, when asked by Joost Kuurman whether the starting point of his 
plays was an idea or a lot of research, Tom Stoppard answered: 
It’s an idea. I don’t really, on the whole, write plays which require research, I mean, some of 
them look as though they require research, but they’re written out of my own interests. 
Certainly I had to do some research, if you like, for Travesties, because there was a separate 
decision to write about certain people in a certain place, so I read, I had to read a lot; but 
apart from that it’s not really a matter of researching a subject and then feeling that one has 
something to write about. It’s the other way round really. It starts off with an idea and I find 
out things if I need to. (Interview 44–45) 
Taking into account Stoppard’s output, one has to admit that the research done 
by him out of interest is especially impressive as it includes history, philosophy, 
art (especially painting), literature and science. Tom Stoppard’s Hapgood (1988) 
is a spy drama which not only parodies “the double agent plot of Le Carré” 
(Rusinko 110) but also, according to Demastes, “is a spy thriller that operates at 
several science-informed levels” (42). The plot of the play concerns discovering 
which of the members of the British Secret Service is a double agent acting 





systematically and carefully, and is metaphorically illustrated by discoveries of 
modern physics: Albert Einstein’s theory of relativity, Richard. P. Feynman’s 
The Character of Physical Law postulating that the nature of electrons which 
may be perceived as either particles or waves escapes a clear definition, and Karl 
Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle. 
Making numerous references to the discoveries of modern physics, 
Hapgood demonstrates the changes that have occurred in our conception of 
reality as a result of the shift from Newtonian mechanics to the formulation of 
relativity and quantum theory. Classical Newtonian physics postulated a 
permanent external world, fixed, objective and describable. Scientific laws were 
always based on strict cause-and-effect principles and were independent of the 
perceiver. Modern physics has shown that once it is discovered that a law does 
not hold in conditions in which it has so far been considered to hold, it is 
necessary to search for new explanations. This notion was expressed by Richard 
Feynman in his Lectures on Physics, from which Stoppard takes the motto for 
his play and to which he often refers in the course of the play. 
As is so often in the case of Stoppard’s plays, Hapgood is also a 
combination of different elements and ideas which interplay with one another to 
form a complex and elaborate structure. Commenting on the process of writing 
Jumpers, Stoppard made a few remarks which are fully justified in the context of 
his literary output: “At the same time there is more than one point of origin for a 
play, and the only useful metaphor I can think of for the way I think I write my 
plays is convergences of different threads. Perhaps carpet-making would suggest 
something similar” (qtd. in Hayman 4–5). 
In the very same year, 1988, that is, eight years after having written 
Hapgood, Stoppard indicated several ideas which gave impetus to the play. He 
told Shusha Guppy: 
 
For Hapgood, the thing I wanted to write about seemed to suit the form of an espionage 
thriller. . . . It had to do with mathematics. I am not a mathematician but I was aware that for 
centuries mathematics was considered the queen of the sciences because it claimed certainty. 
It was grounded on some fundamental certainties – axioms – which led to others. But then, in 
a sense, it all started going wrong, with concepts like non-Euclidean geometry – I mean, 
looking at it from Euclid’s point of view. The mathematics and physics turned out to be 
grounded on uncertainties, on probability and chance. . . . I started reading mathematics 
without finding what I was looking for. In the end I realized that what I was after was 
something which any first-year physics student is familiar with, namely quantum 
mechanics. . . . I didn’t research quantum mechanics but I was fascinated by the mystery 
which lies in the foundation of the observable world, of which the most familiar example is 
the particle-wave duality of light. I thought it was a good metaphor for human personality. 
The language of espionage lends itself to this duality – think of the double agent. (qtd. in 
Guppy 179–80) 
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In an interview with Peter Lewis, Stoppard claimed he was eager to “write 
about ultimate uncertainty. Quantum mechanics is about probability and the lack 
of absolutes. In investigating matter, the deeper they go, the smaller the 
particles, the less certainty they find. That seemed to me to be an exploitable 
idea” (“Quantum Stoppard” 58). He told Michael Billington soon after the play’s 
opening night: “The play is specifically about a woman – Hapgood. . . . The 
central idea is that inside Hapgood one there is a Hapgood two sharing the same 
body; that goes for most of us” (qtd. in Billington 28). “The espionage thing,” he 
insisted in a television interview with Kate Kellaway, “came second. It was just 
a consequence of looking for some sort of narrative which would try to 
exemplify the first thought” (qtd. in Delaney 130).1 Stoppard’s last declaration 
gave the subtitle to a subchapter discussing the play in William Demastes’ study 
of contemporary theatre, “Stoppard’s Hapgood: Double Agency and Quantum 
Personalities” (41–49), as it aptly combines the dualities existing in the play: the 
particle-wave duality in quantum mechanics, double agents, three couples of 
twins working in the network, “technical” and “personal” sides of most 
characters. Fleming also notices the duality of the structure of the play as nearly 
all of the scenes have their doubles (181). 
The basic propositions taken from quantum mechanics are explained to Paul 
Blair, Hapgood’s superior, by Joseph Kerner, an atomic physicist; a double 
agent, working as a sleeper for the Russians and as a joe for the British; the 
father of Hapgood’s son, Joe. The mystery inherent in quantum mechanics 
makes Kerner doubt the possibility of describing objective reality. Twice in the 
course of the play, during dialogues with Blair, who insists that he likes “to 
know what’s what,” Kerner remarks ironically: “[O]bjective reality.” When, on 
the first occasion, Blair observes: “I thought you chaps believed in that,” a 
conversation follows: 
 
KERNER. ‘You chaps’? Oh, scientists. (Laughs) ‘You chaps!’ Paul, objective reality is for 
zoologists. ‘Ah, yes, definitely a giraffe.’ But a double agent is not like a giraffe. A double 
agent is more like a trick of the light. Look. Look at the edge of the shadow. It is straight like 
the edge of the wall that makes it. Your Isaac Newton saw this and he concluded that light 
was made of little particles. Other people said light is a wave but Isaac Newton said, no, if 
light was a wave the shadow would bend round the wall like water bends round a stone in the 
river. . . . Every time we don’t look we get a wave pattern. Every time we look to see how we 
get wave pattern, we get particle pattern. The act of observing determines the reality. 
BLAIR. How? 
KERNER. Nobody knows. Einstein didn’t know. I don’t know. There is no explanation in 
classical physics. Somehow light is particle and wave. (10–12) 
 
                                                                




On the second occasion, the following conversation takes place: 
 
KERNER. So now I am a prime suspect – I love that phrase, it’s in nearly all the books. 
A prime is a number which cannot be divided except by itself, and all the suspects are 
prime; threes, fives, sevens, elevens . . . But really suspects are like squares, the product 
of twin roots, fours, nines, sixteens . . . what is the square root of sixteen? 
BLAIR. Is this a trick question? 
KERNER. For you probably.  
BLAIR. Four, then. 
KERNER. Correct. But also minus four. Two correct answers. Positive and negative. I 
am very fond of that minus, it is why I am what I am, I mean not as a suspect but as a 
physicist. Literally. I am an alchemist of energy and mass, I can turn one into the other 
and back again, because energy is mass multiplied by the speed of light squared. But the 
famous equation was not precisely found in its famous form, it was really the square of 
that, and E equals MC squared is a square root. But of course so is E equals minus MC 
squared, an equally correct solution . . . just like with your sixteen. Nobody took notice 
of the minus for years, it didn’t seem to mean anything, there was nothing to which it 
belonged, you needed a minus world, an anti-world, with all the charges reversed, 
positive for negative, negative for positive. But finally someone trusted the mathematics 
and said – Well, maybe there is anti-matter; anti-atoms made of anti-particles. And lo!, 
they started to find them. And so on, et cetera, until, here I am, Joseph Kerner, the anti-
matter man at the zoo. . . . We’re all doubles. Even you. . . . The one who puts on the 
clothes in the morning is the working minority, but at night – perhaps in the moment 
before unconsciousness – we meet our sleeper – the priest is visited by the doubter, the 
Marxist sees the civilising force of the bourgeoisie, the captain of industry admits the 
justice of common ownership. (71–72) 
 
As a matter of fact, Kerner (Stoppard?) makes three mathematical mistakes 
in the above speech. Firstly, a prime may be divided both by itself and by one. 
Secondly, E does not have to be a square. Take, for instance, M = 2 and C = 3. 
Calculated on the basis of Einstein’s equation, E is then 2 multiplied by 9 and 
equals 18, which is not a square. Thirdly, it does not follow from his discussion 
of Einstein’s equation that anti-matter exists. What he “proves” at best is that E, 
being a square number (a mistake in itself), has both a positive and a negative 
root and thus anti-energy exists. The mathematical correctness does not seem to 
be important in this case, however. What is important is the point being made 
about human nature. At the root of a single individual, we may find two 
(sometimes even more) opposites: priest and doubter, patriot and traitor, socialist 
and capitalist, “sleeper” and “joe.” The notion of duality inherent in human 
nature helps Stoppard present and solve the mystery concerning espionage. Not 
only are some of the spies double-agents but, having twins, they are literally 
doubled. The analogy between particle physics and square numbers extends 
beyond espionage to include a much more general notion of the mystery of 
human identity itself and the nature of reality as such. 
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Elizabeth Hapgood, the only woman in the man-dominated world of 
espionage presented in the play, is the drama’s main character as the title 
indicates. She appears in nearly all the scenes, the only two exceptions being 
scene two in act one and scene three in act two which are set at the zoo and 
present Kerner explaining Feynman’s experiment and the nature of a square 
number to Blair. When the audience first see her in the opening scene at the 
pool, Hapgood is taking part in an exchange of briefcases, an act which aims to 
find the traitor among them. She is then efficient, fully in command of the 
situation until, later on, it appears that they have blown it. When she makes her 
second appearance in scene three, she is busy watching her son playing rugby 
and discussing problems concerning the network with her superior, Blair. 
Hapgood’s reactions to her son’s achievements as well as the remarks she makes 
about him indicate that she is (or, at least, would like to be) a loving mother. The 
first two glimpses of the woman we get in the play, then, present her “technical” 
and “personal” sides. 
In several places in the play, references are made to the difference between 
the “technical” and “personal” aspect both of the situation and the characters 
involved (17, 24, 52). Thus, then, two aspects of Hapgood’s character are 
presented. In the world of espionage, she is the network co-ordinator: an 
intelligent and efficient person, not only knowing the tricks of the trade but also 
capable of winning a chess game without having a chess board in front of her. It 
is here that she has her “joes” and is called by them “Mother.” Blair comments 
on the origin of her code name: “[S]he was called Mother when she joined the 
Defence Liaison Committee – the tea would arrive and the Minister would say, 
‘Who’s going to be mother?’” (27). When the tea-tray is brought in during one 
of the meetings in the course of the play, she asks “brightly” whether she should 
be mother (39). To some extent, at least, even in the present times, she is a 
mother figure for her joes, making sure they are treated properly and not harmed 
by unjustified accusations and suspicion. On the whole, “technically” speaking, 
she is a strong, most independent woman who organises and supervises the 
activities of her network and the men working in it. 
On the “personal” level, she seems very vulnerable, unhappy and torn by 
conflicting emotions of whether to follow the line of duty towards the network 
or towards the closest ones, her two “Joes,” Joseph Kerner and their son, Joe 
Hapgood. In the past, when she had a love affair with Joe Kerner and got 
pregnant, she decided to keep it secret because, as Ridley, another British agent 
and Hapgood’s close associate, phrases it, “it was a choice between losing a 
daddy and losing a prize double, a turned mole who would have been blown 
overnight if he was known to be the father, and we aren’t in the daddy business, 
we’re in the mole business” (81). At present, she senses that little Joe’s staying 




him, on which she comments to Blair at the rugby pitch while both of them are 
watching Joe play (18–19). Hapgood’s vulnerability is visible in this scene and 
in the fact that she invites Blair to have tea with her: “Do you want some tea? 
They lay it on for parents and he’s entitled to two” (24). She seems to be 
dependent on Blair, her section chief, whom she looks upon as a surrogate 
father-figure for herself and her son. She needs his friendship and responds to 
his affection, and that is why she is so disappointed and infuriated when it 
appears at the end of the play that, making little Joe come to the swap scene, 
Blair jeopardised his safety (86). 
Hapgood’s private self is also stressed during the scene with Kerner when 
she tells him that his career will be over after his cover as her “joe” has been 
blown. Then suddenly she switches from “technical” to “personal”: “I won’t 
need you any more, I mean I’ll need you again – oh, sugar! – you know what I 
mean – do you want to marry me? I think I’d like to be married?” Kerner, 
however, tells her he has decided to go back to Russia and she concludes: “I 
don’t think I’m going to marry you after all” (50). Her feelings for him seem 
uneasy to define. It could be said that Hapgood does not really know whether or 
not she wants to marry Kerner. It could also be said that because her proposal 
has not been accepted, she takes it back and pretends she does not care. She 
switches back to the “technical” level at the end of their conversation and 
reminds him about their professional meeting in the evening during which they 
will set a trap for Ridley. Her shifting from one aspect of her personality to the 
other is an instance of transgression, as defined by Michel Foucault: 
“[T]ransgression constantly crosses and recrosses a line which closes behind it in 
a wave of extremely short duration” (34). 
The trap set for Ridley consists of two elements. Firstly, Ridley is told that 
little Joe has been kidnapped and will be exchanged for the materials delivered 
to the Russians by him. Only at the end of the scene, when Ridley has already 
left the room and we watch Hapgood talking on the phone with her son, who is 
safe at school, do we discover that the characters were pretending, playing out a 
scene of their own making in order to deceive Ridley. The ambush, then, has 
been set for Ridley but not for the audience. During the swap scene it appears 
that Blair has acted on his own. He has set his own ambush and, without warning 
or consulting anyone, has had the boy brought to the pool. 
Secondly, in order to achieve her aim, Hapgood decides to do so with the aid 
of her own twin, Celia Newton. In this case, the ambush is set both for Ridley and 
for the audience. When the scene in a photographer’s studio opens, we see 
Hapgood, who “is as different from her other self as the flat is different from her 
office” (65). Ridley, talking on the radio with Hapgood, comments on this, saying: 
“She may be your twin sister but there the resemblance ends” (66). The disorderly, 
absent minded, pot-smoking, bohemian Celia is the opposite of the matter-of-fact, 
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well-organised Hapgood. The gap separating them is also underscored by the 
differentiation of the language they use. Hapgood never swears, this being pointed 
out by Blair both indirectly, in teasing her with “f-f-fiddle” (19), the only swear 
word she uses, and directly, when he asks her: “[D]o you never use bad language, 
never ever?” (23). Celia, on the other hand, uses language full of slang expressions 
and obscenities, the very first word uttered by her being scatological. It appears 
that Ridley wants Celia to play the part of Hapgood, which will be a difficult task 
as the two women are diametrically different. 
As we next see them, they are in Hapgood’s office. When Maggs, 
Hapgood’s secretary, enters, Ridley has to be very inventive not to let the 
disguise of the woman be revealed. He does not fully succeed, though, as Celia 
tells Maggs to “piss off” and “[t]he world ends for MAGGS, just for a moment” 
(76). They are now waiting for the phone call which is to settle the details of the 
swap and Celia makes Ridley start playing a card game. The situation is 
complicated as they do not have a deck and Ridley does not know which game 
they are playing. The basis of “snap,” the game they are playing, is twinning 
cards. The players reveal successive cards simultaneously and if they match, the 
first one to say “snap” wins the pair. The player who gets the bigger number of 
pairs wins. The choice of the game metaphorically underscores the doubling of 
the players and spies, there being two Ridleys as well as twin sisters. Celia wins 
this deckless card game just as Hapgood wins her boardless chess games. When 
the telephone rings, Ridley nearly breaks her hand, so that when she starts 
speaking, “she is whimpering and disoriented” (79). Not only does he want 
Celia to pretend she is Hapgood but he also wants her to sound as if she were in 
pain over the loss of her son. This scene demonstrates the notion so important in 
the play that “the act of observing determines the reality” (12). The obvious 
explanation of her sounding as if she were in pain is that she actually is in pain. 
Her interlocutor on the phone may be justified in thinking that her sobbing is an 
expression of her grief and sorrow concerning Joe. The audience, however, 
know that her cry of pain has quite a different explanation. The interpretation 
given by an individual perceiver is thus determined by their perception of reality 
and the information about it provided to them. As the scene ends and Ridley has 
left, the audience discover they have been ambushed: Hapgood tells Maggs what 
the next chess move is to be. It is only then that the audience learn there is no 
Celia: Hapgood is playing the role of her twin sister in order to trap Ridley. 
In scene five, set in a hotel room, we see Hapgood (playing the role of Celia 
again) sleeping. In the preceding scene, Kerner, while discussing everyone’s 
doubles, mentioned meeting our “sleepers,” our hidden selves (72). At the same 
time, he complained about never having seen Elizabeth sleeping (74). Now we 
watch her sleeping, the scene evoking numerous possible interpretations. Firstly, 




Secondly, she is Hapgood’s “sleeper,” her double, her “personal” self. And 
thirdly, she is, as she puts it, Ridley’s “dreamgirl,” “Hapgood without the brains 
or the taste,” this being her answer to his question: “Who the hell are you?” (83). 
In the next scene, set at the pool, Ridley meets his double and “the two men 
embrace briefly” (83). The ensuing exchange of briefcases points to Ridley as 
the traitor, a double agent who is also physically doubled, working with his twin 
brother. It is unclear whether he realises that Hapgood does not have a twin 
sister. If we consider the final sentence uttered by him before being shot, “Well, 
now I don’t know which one you are. One of them can shoot and one of them 
can. . .” (85), we can assume that he believes there are two of them. Yet, if this 
interpretation is accepted, it is difficult to account for his earlier speech: 
 
Listen, be yourself. These people are not for you, in the end they get it all wrong, the 
dustbins are gaping for them. Him most. He’s had enough out of you and you’re getting 
nothing back, he’s dry and you’re the juice. We can walk out of here, Auntie. (83) 
 
The use of the word “Auntie” indicates that he is speaking to Celia and not 
to Hapgood. Yet, if this is the case, what he is saying does not make sense, the 
words being addressed to Hapgood and not Celia. Besides, in the earlier scene, 
he promised he would kill Hapgood (and not Celia) if she set him up (82). It 
seems, therefore, that he does know Celia has never existed as an individual but 
has been only the other self of Hapgood, her sleeper, her private self. If this 
option is taken, the words “be yourself” are an urge directed to Hapgood, asking 
her to stop treating her “technical” side as more important and to concentrate on 
her more real, “personal” self. Hapgood does not or cannot respond and, as 
Ridley reaches for his gun, he is shot by her. While Ridley’s body is carried 
away, Wates spits at her a particularly well chosen epithet, “Oh, you mother” 
(86). Gradually, a transgression begins to take place within Hapgood: “[h]er 
anger starts dispersing into misery” (86). She becomes aware of the implications 
of the situation and of the fact that she has killed a man who, even though 
suspecting a possible risk, decided to help her son. When taking this decision, 
Ridley considered the “personal” more important than the “technical.” While 
shooting him, Hapgood acted as Mother and not as the mother of a child who 
has been saved by Ridley. The killing of Ridley puts her under a great stress. 
Firstly, as an ultimate act of killing someone and, secondly, as the killing of a 
person who loves her and is willing to sacrifice his safety in order to protect her 
and her child. There is yet one more aspect of the situation which should be 
underlined here. Ridley, who transgresses the “technical” by putting the 
“personal” before it, is dead. Blair, for whom the “technical” dominates over the 
“personal” and who has put little Joe at risk, thinks that Hapgood will get over it. 
Hapgood, however, has decided to withdraw. When he argues that “[o]ne has to 
pick oneself up and carry on. It’s them or us, isn’t it?” she finishes her answer 
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insisting on the need to withdraw by saying “oh, f-f-fuck it, Paul!” (87). The 
phrase she uses is evidently one of Celia’s, not one of Hapgood’s. It is yet 
Hapgood who uses it. It can be argued that her using this phrase is an indication 
that her “sleeper” has at last awakened. Due to the new understanding of the 
rules governing espionage achieved thanks to the recent events, she has decided 
to withdraw and to concentrate on the “personal,” which is, as she has found out, 
more important than the “technical.” 
The last glimpse the audience get of her in the play is her “personal” self: 
she is at the rugby pitch, watching her small Joe playing the game. Her other 
Joe, Joseph Kerner, is standing next to her, having come to say good-bye to her 
before his departure for Russia. Kerner is introduced to Joe, yet the boy is not 
told that he is his father. Hapgood suggests to Kerner that they could go to have 
tea together: “They lay it on for parents” (88). This part of the conversation is 
reminiscent of an earlier conversation at the pitch between Hapgood and Blair, 
yet now she does not repeat the end of the sentence (“and he’s entitled to two,” 
24). When Kerner refuses to join her, “[s]he breaks down” and he tries to 
comfort her. As he is about to leave, she cries out: “How can you go? How can 
you?” Then she starts watching the game which has just begun. A few moments 
later, “[s]he turns round and finds that KERNER is still there. She turns back to 
game and comes alive” (89). 
The ending of the play is ambiguous. According to Roger Rees, who played 
the part, “maybe Kerner does not stay at the rugby pitch or maybe he stays for 
the rest of his life or maybe he stays for two days” (qtd. in Delaney 147). The 
ending does not provide an answer as to whether Kerner will leave or stay, yet it 
states explicitly what is most important in life. Simon Jones, who played Blair in 
the Los Angeles production, has remarked that the events of the play make it 
obvious that what is most real and important in life are “straightforward ordinary 
human relationships” (qtd. in Delaney 157). As the curtain falls, the audience 
know that Hapgood has given up the “technical” for the sake of the “personal.” 
Little Joe, who earlier did not even have a mother, Hapgood’s “personal” self 
being suppressed by her “technical” self, now gets his mother back. Maybe he 
will also have a father in the end, the closing of the play indicating that Kerner 
might stay after all. In his earlier play, Stoppard argued that every good boy 
deserves a father and there is no reason to suspect that Joe might be an exception 
to this rule. 
The Faber and Faber edition of Hapgood, presenting three numbered booths 
at the pool and two briefcases placed outside them, refers to the “technical” side 
of the play and is evocative of the beginning of the drama as far as the world of 
espionage is concerned. The cover of the programme of the Aldwych Theatre 
was “dominated by the photograph of young Hapgood, its edges tattered where 




the boy are a pair of rifle sights” (Delaney 140), and referred to and stressed the 
“personal” aspect of Stoppard’s drama. 
The complexity inherent in human nature is not restricted to Hapgood only, 
even though in her case it is most evident. This notion is evoked by a specific 
use of names. Hapgood is given a great number of them. Agents Ridley and 
Merryweather call her “Mother”; her secretary, Maggs, calls her “Mrs 
Hapgood”; Wates uses the form “ma’am”; Blair calls her “Mother” and 
“Elizabeth”; little Joe uses the phrases “Mummy” and “Mum”; and Celia speaks 
of “Betty.” Finally, Kerner employs the Russian form of her name, “Yelizaveta,” 
its diminutives, “Lilya” and “Lilitchka,” and “mamushka.” The etymological 
meaning of the protagonist’s two other names is discussed by Hersh Zeifman, 
who notices that the name, Hapgood, consists of two elements and “Hap 
(defined by the Old English Dictionary as ‘chance or fortune, luck, lot’) is 
specifically linked to good” (196). He furthermore stresses the fact that when 
Hapgood chooses to play her twin sister, “she slyly names herself Celia (Latin 
caelium: heaven) Newton” (194). The variety of names used for Hapgood seems 
to point out that, even though she is the same individual, she yet presents 
divergent images to different people. 
The names of other characters are also telling and add to the overall impact 
of the play. Ridley (a telling name in itself as the characters and the audience 
alike have to solve the riddle of his identity) appears to have Ernest as his first 
name, which becomes meaningful if we realise that while he is a traitor in the 
“technical” sense, he is most earnest in the “personal” sense.2 Zeifman points out 
that “Kerner is thus as much a riddle as Ridley is . . . , the enigma of Kerner’s 
identity, like Ridley’s, is embodied in his very name (German Kern: the nucleus 
of atom)” (191). It can be said, then, that the use of specific telling names is one 
of the ways of introducing the principal thematic interest of the play, that is, the 
difficulty of establishing the nature of human identity and, by extension, the 
nature of reality as such.  
The paper began with Stoppard’s opinion comparing writing plays to 
“carpet-making” and his four opinions concerning the different “threads” which 
converge in Hapgood, indicating that the form of a spy thriller, combined with 
the achievements of quantum mechanics, seemed most suitable to present the 
duality of human nature. In a conversation with Hapgood, Kerner praises this 
genre: 
 
I like them. Well, they’re different, you know. Not from each other naturally. I read in hope 
but they all surprise in the same way. Ridley is not very nice: he’ll turn out to be all right. 
Blair will be the traitor: the one you liked. This is how the author says, “You see! Life is not 
                                                                
2 Affinities between Hapgood and The Importance of Being Earnest are discussed by Cohn 
(144) and Zinman (316). 
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like books, alas!”. . . . When I have learned the language I will write my own book. The 
traitor will be the one you don’t like very much, it will be a scandal. And I will reveal him 
at the beginning. I don’t understand this mania for surprises. If the author knows, it’s rude 
not to tell. (47) 
 
It could be argued that the description of what Kerner’s novel will be like is 
the description of Hapgood. The author, Stoppard himself, does not reveal 
Ridley as the traitor at the beginning, yet he constructs the play in a way similar 
to the rules governing an experiment. From the beginning of the play, the 
audience are aware that the traitor is to be found while the play presents the act 
of setting up an experiment whose aim is to discover whether Ridley is the guilty 
one or not. Unlike a physics experiment, however, the drama not only says how 
the world of things works but also what the world of things means. The relativity 
and uncertainty concerning both the world of physics and the world of human 
beings are unquestionable, yet the overall impact of the play and its final scene 
indicate that one should not sacrifice the “personal” for the “technical,” that one 
should remain faithful to oneself and the loved ones. Paradoxically enough, 
among the numerous dichotomies discernible in the play (light as both particle 
and wave, double agents, twins, art and science, illusion and reality) yet another 
one can be noticed: overall relativity is put side by side with idealism visible in 
the stress placed on the not relative value of simple and basic human 
relationships. 
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